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ABSTRACT 
The decade since the publication of the 2009 National 
Research Council report on forensic science has seen the 
increasing use of a new word to describe forensic results. What 
were once called “facts,” “determinations,” “conclusions,” or 
“opinions,” are increasingly described as “decisions.” Prior to 2009, 
however, the term “decision” was rarely used to describe forensic 
results. Lay audiences, such as lawyers, might be forgiven for 
perceiving this as a surprising turn. In its plain English meaning, 
a “decision” would seem to be a strange word choice to describe the 
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outcome of a scientific analysis, given its connotation of choice and 
preference. In this Article, we trace the recent history of the term 
“decision” in forensic analysis. We simply and clearly explain the 
scientific fields of “decision theory” and “decision analysis” and 
their application to forensic science. We then analyze the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Uniform Language for Testimony 
and Reporting (ULTR) documents that use the term. We argue 
that these documents fail to articulate coherent frameworks for 
reporting forensic results. The Article identifies what we perceive 
to be some key stumbling blocks to developing such frameworks. 
These include a reluctance to observe decision theory principles, a 
reluctance to cohere with sound probabilistic principles, and a 
reluctance to conform to particular logical concepts associated 
with these theories, such as proper scoring rules. The Article 
elucidates each of these perceived stumbling blocks and proposes 
a way to move forward to more defensible reporting frameworks. 
Finally, we explain what the use of the term “decision” could 
accomplish for forensic science and what an appropriate 
deployment of the term would require. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What should forensic scientists call the results1 of their 
analyses? A survey of forensic disciplines, providers, and 
practitioners would reveal a great variety of answers to this 
question. As an example, consider Table 1, a summary of the 
different terms suggested for reporting results for sixteen 
disciplines by one set of testimonial standards, the draft Uniform 
Language for Testimony and Reporting (ULTR), issued by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) in 2016–2017. The draft ULTRs 
contain a wide variety of different words for results: conclusions, 
opinions, determinations, associations, findings, results, and 
classifications. What is the difference between these words? 
Table 1. Proposed and Approved ULTRs Compared 
Discipline Draft 
ULTR 
(2016–2017) 
Words used for 
output of 
analysis 
Approved 
ULTR 
(2018–2019) 
Basis for 
conclusion 
Glass X Conclusion X Decision 
Metallurgy X Determination 
Association 
Result 
X Decision 
Geology X Conclusion X Decision 
Anthropology X Determination X Decision 
Hair X Consistency 
Classification 
X Decision 
Latent Print X Determination X Decision 
Fiber X Association X Decision 
Firearms/
toolmark: 
pattern 
  X Decision 
Firearms/
toolmark: 
fracture 
  X Decision 
Serology X Result X Interpretation 
MtDNA X Determination X Interpretation 
 
 1. In order to avoid playing favorites among competing terms, we use “results” as 
the most generic term in this Article, even though “results” counts among those competing 
terms. 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 551 (2020) 
554 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [57:3 
ySTR   X Interpretation 
Autosomal 
DNA 
  X Likelihood 
ratio 
General 
Chemistry 
X Opinion 
Conclusion 
Result 
X Determination 
Footwear/
Tire 
X Opinion   
Toxicology X Opinion 
Finding 
Result 
  
Fiber X Association   
Paint X Conclusion 
Association 
Determination 
Opinion 
Result 
  
Explosive 
Device 
X Determination 
Association 
  
Explosive 
Chemistry 
X Opinion 
Conclusion 
Determination 
Finding 
Result 
  
Handwriting X Opinion   
— Highlighted rows indicate disciplines for which both a Proposed and an Approved 
ULTR exist. 
— As noted in the text, Approved ULTRs use the word decision, except the four ULTRs 
pertaining to biological evidence. 
—The third column indicates the terms used in the draft ULTR where the Approved 
ULTR uses the term “decision.” 
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Table 2. Summary of Table 1 
Term Number of mentions in draft or 
approved ULTRs 
Decision 10 
Determination 8 
Opinion 6 
Conclusion 5 
Association 5 
Result 5 
Interpretation 3 
Likelihood ratio 1 
Finding 1 
Consistency 1 
Classification 1 
 
Although it is possible to claim that all these words are 
essentially interchangeable, that seems far too simple. Each of 
these words conveys subtle differences in the epistemic strength 
that is attached to the scientific claim. A “determination,” for 
example, suggests that the result has been “determined” by the 
scientific evidence—that is, that no other interpretation of the 
evidence is reasonably conceivable. A “conclusion,” while not quite 
as strong, also conveys the notion that the result logically follows 
from the evidence. (“Conclusion” also has a weaker meaning, 
though, in the sense that it can merely refer descriptively to the 
final section of a scientific report.) “Opinion,” on the other hand, 
conveys that there are at least two possible interpretations of the 
evidence and that the expert is exercising some sort of judgment 
in advocating for one over the other(s). “Findings” and “results” 
are perhaps the most scientific-sounding terms and also seem the 
most neutral with regard to the above issues; these terms may be 
seen as descriptive of what has been observed during examination. 
They also differ from the other terms by lacking an implication of 
moving on to the step of drawing an inference from the evidence, 
much in the way that the “Results” section of a classically 
organized scientific paper merely reports the evidence, whereas 
the “Conclusion” section draws (sometimes speculative) inferences 
from that evidence.2 “Association” and “classification” sound as if 
 
 2. See generally Frederic L. Holmes, Argument and Narrative in Scientific Writing, 
in THE LITERARY STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC ARGUMENT: HISTORICAL STUDIES 164 (Peter 
Dear ed., 1991) (discussing the standard arrangement of scientific papers). 
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they are deliberately chosen for their weakness to temper the 
scientific claim with an appropriate dose of “epistemological 
humility.”3 If we were to order all these terms according to their 
perceived epistemic strength, we might have: determination, 
conclusion, opinion, classification, association, finding, and result. 
As we pass the ten-year anniversary of the publication of the 
National Research Council (NRC) report, Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States,4 however, criminal lawyers may find 
themselves encountering a different term increasingly often. That 
term is “decision.” At first glance, to call the result of a forensic 
analysis a “decision,” rather than, say, a “conclusion,” seems 
decidedly strange. Historically, the results of forensic analyses 
have tended to be described as “opinions.”5 “Decision,” on the other 
hand, seems to imply a degree of choice and preference that would 
seem out of place in a scientific analysis. What could possibly be 
meant by calling the result of a forensic analysis a “decision”? 
Another development over the decade since the publication of 
the NRC report (although it actually began earlier, around 2005) 
has been the publication of a body of scientific literature discussing 
the application of “decision theory,” or “decision analysis,” to 
forensic science problems at the reporting stage.6 The terms 
 
 3. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: 
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 139 (2008). 
 4. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/59PP-X864].  
 5. See Paul L. Kirk, The Ontogeny of Criminalistics, 54 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & 
POLICE SCI. 235, 238 (1963). 
 6. E.g., FRANCO TARONI ET AL., DATA ANALYSIS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: A BAYESIAN 
DECISION PERSPECTIVE (Stephen Senn & Vic Barnett eds., 2010); FRANCO TARONI ET AL., 
BAYESIAN NETWORKS FOR PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE AND DECISION ANALYSIS IN FORENSIC 
SCIENCE (2d ed. 2014); Alex Biedermann et al., Analysing and Exemplifying Forensic 
Conclusion Criteria in Terms of Bayesian Decision Theory, 58 SCI. & JUST. 159 (2018); Alex 
Biedermann et al., Decision Theoretic Properties of Forensic Identification: Underlying 
Logic and Argumentative Implications, 177 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 120, 121–29 (2008) 
[hereinafter Biedermann et al., Decision Theoretic Properties]; Alex Biedermann et al., The 
Decisionalization of Individualization, 266 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 29 (2016) [hereinafter 
Biedermann et al., The Decisionalization]; Alex Biedermann et al., The Consequences of 
Understanding Expert Probability Reporting as a Decision, 57 SCI. & JUST. 80, 83–84 (2017); 
Simone Gittelson et al., Decision-Theoretic Reflections on Processing a Fingermark, 226 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e42, e43–e44 (2013); Franco Taroni et al., Decision Analysis in Forensic 
Science, 50 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Taroni et al., Decision]; Franco Taroni et 
al., Value of DNA Tests: A Decision Perspective, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 31 (2007); Simone 
Gittelson, Evolving from Inferences to Decisions in the Interpretation of Scientific Evidence 
1 (2013) (Ph.D. thesis, School of Criminal Justice, University of Lausanne), https://serv 
al.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_620A73F01CCC.P001/REF.pdf [https://perma.cc/AE94-4W 
QS]. 
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“decision” and “decision-making” (by experts) have also been 
studied from a forensic psychological perspective.7 
What, if anything, do these converging historical phenomena 
involving the same word have to do with one another? It is 
possible, of course, that these are two unrelated phenomena which 
happen to employ the same word. This seems unlikely. Although 
the ULTRs do not explicitly refer to any of the decision theory 
literature, it would be strange indeed if these parallel 
developments were a mere coincidence—that is, to suppose that 
the appearance of the term “decision” in forensic reporting 
standards has nothing to do with the scholarly literature that 
discusses that same term. 
What explains the proliferation of this term, and what does it 
mean for forensic science and for law? In Part II, we introduce and 
analyze the increasing use of the term “decision” in contemporary 
forensic reporting standards, especially the recently issued ULTRs 
regarding forensic reporting formats for federal examiners. In Part 
III, we provide a brief introduction to decision theory and its 
application to legal problems and, in particular, those involving 
forensic evidence. In Part IV, we discuss, and critically analyze in 
detail, the use of the term “decision” in the Approved ULTRs. 
Although the ULTRs remain ambiguous as to whether the term is 
intended to invoke formal decision theory or not, we argue that the 
ULTRs misuse the notion of decision—whether meant formally or 
colloquially—in important ways. In Part V, we discuss the way in 
which decision theory, properly applied, can be useful in framing 
legal problems involving forensic evidence. Ultimately, we argue 
that while decision theory may be useful to forensic practitioners, 
primarily in educating them about what not to do, it should be of 
great benefit to legal practitioners in understanding the 
requirements of making legal decisions based on forensic evidence 
and in better understanding where scientific analysis should end 
and legal analysis should begin. 
 
 7. E.g., Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to 
Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 75–77 (2006); William C. 
Thompson, Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis for an Expert Opinion: What Do 
Experts Need to Know and When Do They Know Too Much?, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO 
BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 133, 147–48 
(2016). 
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II. COLLOQUIAL VERSUS FORMAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE 
NOTION OF DECISION 
The proliferation of forensic experts characterizing the results 
of their analyses as “decisions” appears to be a relatively recent 
phenomenon. We have been unable to find any forensic standards 
document that uses the term “decision” prior to 2011.8 And yet, the 
use of the term “decision” appears to be on the rise. In 2011 the 
U.S. standard-setting body for friction ridge (“latent print” or 
“fingerprint”) analysis changed the word “conclusion,” which it 
had used in its 2009 standard, to “decision” in describing the 
results of analyses.9 Observe below the change in the description 
of the “evaluation” step of friction ridge analysis10 between the 
2009 NRC report (that is the subject of this Symposium) and the 
2012 National Institute of Standard and Technology/National 
Institute of Justice (NIST/NIJ) report on human factors in friction 
ridge analysis only three years later: 
NRC (2009) 
Source determination is made when the examiner 
concludes, based on his or her experience, that sufficient 
quantity and quality of friction ridge detail is in agreement 
between the latent print and the known print.11 
NIST/NIJ (2012) 
In the Evaluation phase, the examiner makes the ultimate 
decision regarding source attribution.12 
 
 8. See SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY & TECH., 
STANDARDS FOR EXAMINING FRICTION RIDGE IMPRESSIONS AND RESULTING CONCLUSIONS 
(2011), http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/examinations-conclusions/111026_Examinatio 
ns-Conclusions_1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y278-GJGC] (using the term “decision” to refer to 
examiners’ conclusions about fingerprints). 
 9. Id.; SCI. WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY & TECH., FRICTION 
RIDGE EXAMINATION METHODOLOGY FOR LATENT PRINT EXAMINERS (2009), http://clpex.com 
/swgfast/documents/methodology/100506-Methodology-Reformatted-1.01-Archived.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/X4SS-KE9M]. 
 10. This is the “E” in the notorious “ACE-V methodology.” Sandy L. Zabell, 
Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143, 154, 178 (2005) (characterizing ACE-V as “an 
acronym, not a methodology”).  
 11. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 138 (emphasis added). 
 12. EXPERT WORKING GRP. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS, LATENT 
PRINT EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS 
APPROACH 7 (2012) (emphasis added), https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_ 
id=910745 [https://perma.cc/GLS9-HPTE]. 
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 The change in other disciplines has been slower, but draft 
standards documents used the term “decision” for drug analysis in 
201413 and glass analysis in 2017.14 
The explosion of the use of “decision” across the forensic 
disciplines, however—and the primary subject of this Article—
dates to the publication of the ULTR documents by the DOJ in 
2018 and 2019, almost exactly a decade after the publication of the 
NRC report. 
In February 2016, the Deputy Attorney General of the United 
States announced that the DOJ would develop what would later 
become the ULTRs, but were then called “Approved Scientific 
Standards for Testimony and Reports” (ASSTRs), in many forensic 
disciplines.15 Describing the ASSTRs, the Deputy Attorney 
General said, “We hope this effort will serve as a model for 
demonstrating our commitment to strengthening forensic science, 
now and in the future.”16 The first draft documents, by then 
renamed ULTRs, were published for public comment in June 
2016.17 
In April 2017, the U.S. Attorney General sunsetted the 
National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS).18 This was an 
important development, because the NCFS had been created in 
2013 “to provide recommendations and advice to the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) concerning national methods and strategies for: 
strengthening the validity and reliability of the forensic 
sciences.”19 The Attorney General replaced the NCFS with a 
 
 13. SCI. WORKING GRP. FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SEIZED DRUGS, RECOMMENDATIONS 9, 
28, 53 (2014), http://www.swgdrug.org/Documents/SWGDRUG%20Recommendations%20V 
ersion%207-0_Archived.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQ82-6LHQ]. 
 14. Overseas Sec. Advisory Council, Standard Practice for Interpretation and Report 
Writing in Forensic Comparisons of Trace Materials 16 (May 4, 2017) (unpublished draft) 
(on file with the first Author). 
 15. Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., Remarks During the 68th Annual Science 
Meeting Hosted by the American Academy of Forensic Science (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-q-yates-delivers-remarks-during-68th 
-annual-scientific [https://perma.cc/DC58-CRBX] (“To address this problem [of testimonial 
overstatement revealed by the microscopic hair comparison review], the FBI is close to 
finalizing new internal standards for testimony and reporting—which they’re calling 
‘Approved Scientific Standards for Testimony and Reports,’ or ASSTR.”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/archives/ 
dag/forensic-science [https://perma.cc/N4V2-J32J] (last visited Jan. 31, 2020). 
 18. Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Orders Justice Dept. to End Forensic Science 
Commission, Suspend Review Policy, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washington 
post.com/local/public-safety/sessions-orders-justice-dept-to-end-forensic-science-commissio 
n-suspend-review-policy/2017/04/10/2dada0ca-1c96-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/4286-HNRG]. 
 19. NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHARTER 1 (2015), htt 
 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 551 (2020) 
560 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [57:3 
Forensic Science Working Group.20 In the announcement of this 
new organization, the ULTRs were among only two specific 
projects mentioned that the DOJ would pursue “aimed at ensuring 
that the testimony of the Justice Department’s forensic examiners 
is consistent with sound scientific principles and just outcomes.”21 
ULTRs are part of the DOJ’s “quality assurance measures to 
help ensure that the results of forensic analyses are properly 
qualified and appropriately communicated in both reports and 
testimony.”22 In essence, an ULTR purportedly “reflects the range 
of appropriate conclusions that Department examiners may 
provide in reports and testimony. It also sets forth important 
scientific limitations on those conclusions and other testimonial 
assertions.”23  
In 2018, at the annual meeting of the American Academy of 
Forensic Science, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein 
announced the DOJ’s “[p]lans to [a]dvance [f]orensic [s]cience.”24 
In fleshing out these “[p]lans,” the DOJ’s press release listed four 
specific actions.25 First among these was the publication of the 
ULTR for the latent print discipline.26 As Rosenstein noted, the 
latent print ULTR “is the first approved Uniform Language 
document.”27 Consistent with the increasing use of the term 
“decision” in that discipline, the latent print ULTR used the term 
“decision” to characterize the result of friction ridge analyses.28 In 
 
ps://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/624216/download [https://perma.cc/U2H6-KEWQ].  
 20. Beth Reinhard, Sessions Scuttles Forensics Team, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2017, at 
A5; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Announces Plans to Advance Forensic 
Sci. (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-plans-adv 
ance-forensic-science [https://perma.cc/2W5B-6Z8K]. 
 21. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 20. 
 22. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney Gen. to Heads of Dep’t Components 2 
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1036796/download [https://perma.cc/MD32-2V 
8F]. 
 23. Id. at 1. 
 24. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 20. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. The other three were: (1) a testimony monitoring framework; (2) plans (as 
yet unfulfilled) to publish documents such as quality management documents and internal 
validation studies (and, presumably, standard operating procedures); and (3) “the 
rechartering of the Council of Federal Forensic Laboratory Directors.” Id. For more on 
standard operation procedures on the FBI’s Latent Print Unit, see Simon A. Cole, 
Implementing Counter-Measures Against Confirmation Bias in Forensic Science, 2 J. 
APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 61 (2013). 
 27. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 
American Academy of Forensic Science (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ 
deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-american-academy-forensic-sciences 
[https://perma.cc/R8HF-62C2]. 
 28. Simon A. Cole, A Discouraging Omen: A Critical Evaluation of the Approved 
Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Latent Print Discipline, 34 
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2019, twelve more Approved ULTRs were published. As noted 
supra, nearly all of the Approved ULTRs use the term “decision,” 
replacing words like “determination,” “conclusion,” or “result.”29  
How does “decision” differ from these discarded terms? 
“Decision” can be distinguished from these terms by a certain 
sense of choice or free will on the part of the expert. Formal 
decision theory uses the term preference, that is the decision-
maker’s expression of preferences among decision options (possible 
courses of action), and that term works quite well for the colloquial 
usage of the word “decision” as well. To be sure, the word “opinion” 
seems to contain the notion of choice as well. But “opinion” 
suggests that the expert is choosing the most plausible of the 
possible interpretations. A scientist’s “opinion” (about a scientific 
matter) must necessarily—according to common 
understandings—be that which she believes most likely to be true. 
But a decision does not necessarily seem to require that. And, 
indeed, as we shall see below, decision theory can offer examples 
of cases in which one can rationally make a “decision” that 
contradicts one’s “opinion.”30 
To illustrate the differences among these words, we attach 
each of them to a scientific result in Table 3. 
  
 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1103, 1119–20 (2018). 
 29. See supra Table 1. 
 30. See infra Part III.  
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Table 3. Illustration of the Differences Between the Terms 
“Determination,” “Conclusion,” “Opinion” and “Decision” 
Suppose a 
physician says . . . 
Possible interpretation of the 
physician’s statement 
 
. . . she determined 
that the patient has a 
medical condition. 
This would seem to convey that the 
physician has gotten a positive result from 
some sort of test that strongly indicates the 
target condition, though it conveys nothing 
about what, if anything, will be 
communicated to the patient. 
 
. . . she concluded 
that the patient has a 
medical condition. 
This sounds less like the physician is 
relying on a single definitive test, but rather 
is relying on a heterogeneous assemblage of 
evidence, but nonetheless the physician 
seems to be claiming that the diagnosis 
(probably) follows from that evidence. 
 
. . . it is her opinion 
that the patient has a 
medical condition. 
Now the physician sounds a bit less certain 
of the diagnosis. She seems to be 
acknowledging the possibility of alternative 
interpretations of the evidence but still 
believes that the diagnosis is the most 
plausible interpretation. 
 
. . . she has decided 
that the patient has a 
medical condition. 
This would sound strange to most people’s 
ears. Why is the physician using the term 
“decide” instead of one of the above terms? 
It sounds like some deliberate element, i.e. 
the physician’s preference, has been 
incorporated into the analysis, and this does 
not seem appropriate.31 
 
  
 
 31. Notice that we are talking only about “deciding” on the presence of the medical 
condition. For a physician to decide whether to tell the patient they have a medical condition 
or how to treat the patient for the condition do not sound nearly as strange, are different 
matters entirely, and, in fact, as we shall see infra, are good illustrations of the proper 
application of decision theory.  
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Consider likewise the following examples: 
 
— A theoretical physicist says she has “determined” that the 
Higgs boson exists. 
— A theoretical physicist says she has “concluded” that the 
Higgs boson exists. 
— A theoretical physicist says it is her “opinion” that the 
Higgs boson exists. 
— A theoretical physicist says she has “decided” that the 
Higgs boson exists. 
 
— A climate scientist has “determined” that anthropogenic 
climate change is occurring. 
— A climate scientist has “concluded” that anthropogenic 
climate change is occurring. 
— A climate scientist says it is her “opinion” that 
anthropogenic climate change is occurring. 
— A climate scientist has “decided” that anthropogenic 
climate change is occurring. 
 
In both of these illustrations, the “decision” example stands 
out as something that sounds unsuitable for an expert to be saying 
about a scientific matter. Again, it sounds like it contains some 
element that should not be there. That element, we argue, is 
preference. Making that very notion of preference transparent and 
logically coherent is one of the aims of decision theory as we shall 
explain in the next Part. 
III. DECISION THEORY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 
A. Decision Theory 
The 1940s, and the decades that followed, marked a time 
characterized by an increasing interest in systematic methods of 
problem analysis, problem solving, and decision-making.32 At the 
same time, the development of the computer favored fields of study 
with a common interest in decision-making and decision analysis, 
in particular artificial intelligence.33 The notion of decision also 
 
 32. Ralph F. Miles, Jr., The Emergence of Decision Analysis, in ADVANCES IN 
DECISION ANALYSIS: FROM FOUNDATIONS TO APPLICATIONS 13, 22–25 (Ward Edwards et al. 
eds., 2007). 
 33. Eric J. Horvitz et al., Decision Theory in Expert Systems and Artificial 
Intelligence, 2 INT’L J. APPROXIMATE REASONING 247, 248 (1988).  
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attracted researchers in disciplines such as mathematics, 
statistics, philosophy of science, and psychology, among others, 
sometimes referred to as decision sciences.34 Economists, for 
example, were interested in applications where decisions had 
monetary consequences, and the aim was to make decisions that 
reflected coherent behavior with regard to the decision-maker’s 
preferences among decision consequences and judgments about 
uncertain events upon which decision consequences depend.35 Not 
surprisingly, such considerations also found appeal among legal 
scholars.36 
Generally speaking, decision theory combines probability 
theory with utility theory. It is a mathematical theory for 
analyzing decision problems under uncertainty, providing criteria 
for the comparison of rival decisions. The probability component of 
decision theory should be well-known to at least some legal 
readers: probability provides a way to coherently assign beliefs 
about propositions (i.e., assertions about the real-world)37 when 
knowledge and information are incomplete. In turn, utility theory 
provides a framework for appraising the relative desirability of the 
various possible decision consequences.38 Here, a decision 
consequence (also called outcome) is understood as the result of 
choosing a particular action when a particular state of the world 
applies. 
Decision theory as considered here focuses on an individual’s 
point of view; it is an individualistic theory in that it supposes a 
single decision-maker or a group of persons who act in common 
(i.e., express a common opinion).39 For our present purposes, we 
 
 34. See Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: A Personal Account of How It Got Started 
and Evolved, 50 OPERATIONS RES. 179, 184 (2002).  
 35. E.g., John W. Pratt et al., The Foundations of Decision Under Uncertainty: An 
Elementary Exposition, 59 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 353, 356 (1964).  
 36. E.g., Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1030–31 
(1977) (applying decision theory in analyzing courts’ discretion to exclude relevant 
evidence).  
 37. In the context here, a proposition is a “statement that is true or false, that can be 
affirmed or denied.” TERENCE ANDERSON ET AL., ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 385 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2005) (1991). 
 38. The notion of preference among decision consequences is well-known in legal 
scholarship and often associated with, for example, Blackstone’s preference for “missed 
convictions” (i.e., wrongly freeing defendants) over wrongful convictions. It should be noted, 
however, that Blackstone’s preference statement seems to relate to error ratios across 
multiples cases, rather than the expression of relative losses for adverse outcomes in a given 
single case. E.g., D.H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian Decision 
Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 1, 4–5 (1999); Larry Laudan & Harry 
D. Saunders, Re-Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus About the 
Utilities of Trial Outcomes, 7 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, no. 2, 2009, at 1, 12–13. 
 39. See Dennis V. Lindley, The Philosophy of Statistics, 49 STATISTICIAN 293, 313 
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leave aside additional complications such as situations of conflict 
and competition. As we will see below, decision theory in the 
classic individualistic sense is powerful enough to substantially 
clarify and sharpen our understanding of the subject of this 
Article. Methodologically, it is a prerequisite for any future, more 
advanced levels of analysis. 
For illustration, consider a simplified application of the 
elements of decision theory. Its reasoning also complies with 
common sense40 and could readily be applied to the colloquial 
meaning of the word “decision.” To avoid idiosyncrasies associated 
with forensic science examples, consider the following simple two-
decision/two-state-of-nature problem.41 Imagine the President of a 
large university. A tropical depression is bearing down on the city 
in which the university is located, along with the possibility of 
flooding on the following day. The President must decide whether: 
(1) to close the university; or (2) NOT close the university.42 The 
President reasons as follows: 
1. I believe that it is more probable that it will NOT flood 
than that it will flood. I believe the probability that it will flood is 
1/3 and the probability that it will NOT flood is 2/3. 
2. If I am correct either way, I will incur no additional 
penalty attributable to my decision (though, of course, there may 
be monetary losses resulting from physical damages to campus 
facilities). If I close the university and it floods, I will be lauded for 
my prudence. If I keep the university open and it does not flood, I 
will be commended for my mettle. 
3. However, if I am wrong either way, I will suffer a 
consequence that, for me, represents a loss. If I keep the 
university open and it floods, the consequence is that people may 
be placed in dangerous situations, and my acting may critically be 
exposed as reckless, possibly damaging my reputation. 
 
(2000). 
 40. E.g., Alex Biedermann et al., Normative Decision Analysis in Forensic Science, 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. (forthcoming 2020), https://link.springer.com/article/10.100 
7%2Fs10506-018-9232-2 [https://perma.cc/7MMZ-JBDH]. 
 41. A similar example is described in Taroni et al., Decision, supra note 6, at 5–9. 
 42. Participants in, and prospective attendees of, the University of Houston Law 
Center Symposium on the Future of Crime Labs and Forensic Science may find this 
illustration eerily familiar. For an example regarding the decision to order an evacuation 
in the context of earthquakes, see Stephen S. Hall, At Fault?, 477 NATURE 264, 265, 269 
(2011), for a report on the devastating earthquake in the area around the Italian city of 
L’Aquila, causing over 300 fatalities and leading to subsequent trials for manslaughter of 
individuals involved in assessing whether an earthquake was imminent. 
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4. On the other hand, if I close the university and it does not 
flood, the consequence is that people will lose out on a variety of 
educational activities for no reason. As just one of many examples, 
academic symposia scheduled for that day, for which scholars may 
have traveled great distances and endured extensive delays, may 
be cancelled.  
5. However, the losses associated with (3) are much greater 
than the losses associated with (4) because they involve physical 
danger, rather than mere inconvenience. Stated otherwise, I 
greatly prefer the consequences associated with (4) to those 
associated with (3).43 
6. Hence, I decide to close the university, even though my 
opinion is that it is more probable that it will NOT flood, than 
that it will flood (see point (1)). 
In summary, the example illustrates a situation in which each 
of the two decisions can lead to a specific adverse outcome, or to a 
nonadverse outcome. If one way of deciding can lead to a much 
more adverse consequence than the alternative way of deciding, 
then we should weigh the stakes involved against our beliefs of 
how the world will turn out.44 For the example considered here, 
even though there is a preponderant probability that it will not 
flood, the more severe potential consequences of flooding deter the 
President from keeping the university open. Instead, one ought to 
opt for the decision to close the university. Decision theory allows 
the President to think rationally about the decision problem she 
faces, prior to acting. It allows her to take into consideration not 
only the probabilities of the two possible outcomes but also her 
preferences regarding the consequences of those outcomes (i.e., the 
losses they represent for her). 
B. Forensic Decisionalism 
The applicability of decision theory to legal problems 
involving forensic science should be apparent. A fact-finder may 
be faced with the question of whether Mr. A is the source of a 
fingermark45 or whether Mr. A signed a document. Such questions 
may be conceptualized as decisions. 
 
 43. It is possible, of course, to relax this assumption and consider more general 
examples. 
 44. See Richard D. Friedman, The Persistence of the Probabilistic Perspective, 48 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1589, 1590 (2018); infra Section III.C. 
 45. We will use the term “fingermark” in this Article to denote a trace (possibly 
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In principle, such questions are not very different from the 
issues encountered at other decision points in the legal process, 
including advanced stages of legal proceedings concerned with the 
question of what verdict to render (i.e., conviction or acquittal). In 
legal scholarship, it has long been recognized that such questions 
of decision, in particular their logical underpinnings, can be 
critically analyzed and discussed using formal methods of analysis 
based on, for example, decision theory.46 In this Section, we will 
briefly and informally outline the tenets of decision theory and 
elements of decision analysis as applied to forensic science. 
For example, when a fact-finder decides that the questioned 
handwriting is that of Mr. A,47 but in reality, the handwriting is 
from an unknown person (i.e., the proposition that Mr. A is the 
writer48 is false), then the consequence of the fact-finder’s decision 
will be a false association of Mr. A with the questioned 
handwriting (i.e., an erroneous outcome). Tables 4(i) and 4(ii) 
further illustrate these notions using two examples: an analogy 
between a hypothetical medical diagnosis problem and the 
“problem” of inferring the source of a questioned fingermark (i.e., 
forensic individualization).49 Note that the logic of Table 4 readily 
generalizes to any forensic inference of source problem, for 
example in the controversial tool-/impression- and bite-mark 
examination disciplines, but also in other areas, such as digital 
evidence.50 Classification tasks, too, can be seen as an instance of 
application of Table 4. An example for classification, i.e., 
 
incomplete and of limited quality) left under unknown conditions, as compared to a 
“fingerprint” taken from a known person under controlled (laboratory) conditions. E.g., 
CHRISTOPHE CHAMPOD ET AL., FINGERPRINTS AND OTHER RIDGE SKIN IMPRESSIONS 317 (2d 
ed. 2016). 
 46. The first detailed decision theoretic account for legal applications is widely 
attributed to John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 
1065 (1968). 
 47. We do not intend to suggest that forensic examiners should express themselves 
in this way. We merely use this example because forensic document examiners commonly 
do express direct opinions about particular propositions regarding the source of 
handwritten items, though as we will point out in later parts of this Article, such 
statements require assessments and assumptions that go beyond the scope of the forensic 
examiners’ area of competence. Judges and jurors with knowledge of the entire case file are 
more suitably positioned to give such statements. 
 48. In later parts of this Article, the proposition that the handwriting is from Mr. A 
will be denoted Hp for short, and the proposition that an unknown person is the writer, Hd. 
 49. Note that for simplicity, only two decisions are considered here, “identifying” Mr. 
A as the source of the fingermark and “not identifying” Mr. A. For a more general decision 
theoretic development, allowing for more than two decisions, see Biedermann et al., 
Decision Theoretic Properties, supra note 6. 
 50. For example, propositions of interest (i.e., states of nature) in digital evidence 
could be “this digital video was recorded using Mr. A’s mobile phone” versus “this digital 
video was recorded with an unknown digital device.” 
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“identifying” an object as belonging to a particular class,51 is the 
determination of the nature of examined material (e.g., a scientist 
may “identify” tiny transparent fragments as glass, or a yellowish-
white powder as cocaine, etc.). 
Table 4. Illustration of the Notions of Decision, States of Nature, and 
Decision Consequences (Which May Be Correct or Erroneous) 
 States of Nature   States of Nature 
Decisions 
Patient 
is 
infected 
Patient 
is not 
infected 
 
Decisions 
Fingermark 
comes from 
Mr. A 
Fingermark 
comes from 
unknown 
person 
Diagnose 
infection correct error 
 Conclude 
that 
fingermark 
comes from 
Mr. A 
correct error 
Do not 
diagnose 
infection 
error correct 
 Do not 
conclude that 
fingermark 
comes from 
Mr. A 
error correct 
(i)  (ii) 
 
Table 4 may be familiar to some readers as a “confusion 
matrix” used in the approach to identification known as “signal 
detection” analysis.52 Numerous commentators, most recently the 
PCAST53 report, have noted the importance of data regarding the 
 
 51. Kirk, supra note 5, at 236. 
 52. See generally Victoria L. Phillips et al., The Application of Signal Detection Theory 
to Decision-Making in Forensic Science, 46 J. FORENSIC SCI. 294 (2001); EXPERT WORKING 
GRP. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS, supra note 12, at 26–27 (explaining 
signal detection theory). 
 53. The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) is “an 
advisory group of the Nation’s leading scientists and engineers” who directly advise the 
President of the United States and the Executive Office of the President. PCAST makes 
policy recommendations in the many areas where understanding of science, technology, and 
innovation is key to strengthening our economy and forming policy that works for the 
American people. The PCAST report was published in September 2016 at the request of 
President Obama. The report reviewed several fields of forensic science for the purpose of 
strengthening the various fields and clarifying the requirements for what it called 
“foundational validity” and “validity as applied.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON 
SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: 
ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS, at x–xi (2016) 
[hereinafter PCAST REPORT], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/mic 
rosites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCY4-3T7Z]. 
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frequency of the four outcomes depicted in Table 4 in controlled 
studies in which ground truth is known.54 They have also noted 
the general absence of such data for many forensic disciplines. 
This criticism has become increasingly well-known and 
understood in legal and forensic circles. What is less well-known 
and understood—and glossed over by the PCAST report—
however, is that data about accuracy is necessary but still not 
sufficient. More is needed to enable sound decision-making. 
At this juncture, the reader might wonder why it is not 
sufficient, as suggested by PCAST and Professor Kafadar, for 
example, to obtain data on false positives and negatives, obtained 
from multiple training cases (with known ground truth), in order 
to derive general performance measures such as sensitivity and 
specificity. The point is that while such measures may be 
informative about a particular method or technique in general 
(e.g., in discourses about admissibility), they do not directly 
address what decision to make in a given case at hand, or whether 
a particular decision made in a given case is suitable.55 Although 
it is true that there are standard probabilistic procedures available 
for using probabilities for false positive and false negative results 
to arrive at inductive probabilistic conclusions about propositions 
of interest,56 this solves only half of the decision problem. The 
reason for this is that we do not only decide based solely on what 
we believe to be true (i.e., the extent to which we think that a 
particular proposition is true), but also based on our preferences 
among the possible decision consequences! 
Decision theory explicitly acknowledges these preferences by 
attaching utilities (or losses) to decision consequences. These 
utilities (losses) express the relative (un-) desirability of the 
various decision consequences. For example, in the case of a 
fingermark examination as depicted in Table 4(ii), a decision 
theoretic analysis requires one to express a ranking among the 
different decision outcomes. Following common understanding in 
 
 54. Id. at 5–6; Gary Edmond et al., A Guide to Interpreting Forensic Testimony: 
Scientific Approaches to Fingerprint Evidence, 13 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 9–11 (2014); 
Karen Kafadar, Statistical Issues in Assessing Forensic Evidence, 83 INT’L STAT. REV. 111, 
113–16 (2015); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 118. As part of its call for the 
scrutiny of foundational validity, PCAST encourages the establishment of more studies “in 
which many examiners render decisions about many independent tests (typically, involving 
‘questioned’ samples and one or more ‘known’ samples) and the error rates are determined.” 
PCAST REPORT, supra note 53, at 5–6 (emphasis added). 
 55. Alex Biedermann et al., A Formal Approach to Qualifying and Quantifying the 
‘Goodness’ of Forensic Identification Decisions, 17 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 295, 305 (2018). 
 56. To pass from a probability (Pr) of a finding (E) given a proposition (H), Pr(E|H), 
to a probability for the proposition given the evidence, Pr(H|E), Bayes’ theorem needs to be 
invoked. 
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forensic science, this would mean preferring accurate outcomes 
over erroneous outcomes. That much is obvious. More subtly, the 
decision-maker may also have preferences even between different 
erroneous outcomes. For example, it is common in forensic science 
to claim that a false exclusion should be regarded as less adverse 
than a false identification. For example, one possible ranking of 
the relative desirability of outcomes for fingerprint analysis might 
be: 
1. Correct decision same source (tie) 
 Correct decision not to identify (tie) 
2. Incorrect decision not to identify 
3. Incorrect decision same source 
The situation in (2) is often considered less adverse than (3) 
because it would tend to lead to the exculpation of a guilty person. 
The situation in (3) is often considered worse because it would tend 
to incriminate an innocent person.57 Legal philosophy generally 
views the latter as worse than the former, invoking arguments 
such as “Blackstone’s ratio,” even though it is often overlooked 
that the latter refers to ratio across multiple cases, rather than a 
relative assessment within a given case.58 In other applications, 
e.g., security screening, the preferences between (2) and (3) are 
commonly inverted.59 
C. Decision Theoretic Comparison of Rival Decisions 
The above features of decision theory are mainly descriptive. 
They lay out in a clear and transparent way the inevitable and 
fundamental ingredients of any problem of decision under 
uncertainty. But there is more to decision theory. Decision theory 
also provides guidance on how to coherently combine probabilities 
for each state of nature with utilities (or losses) for possible 
decision consequences in order to provide a criterion for comparing 
the relative merit of the rival decisions. 
 
 57. Biedermann et al., The Decisionalization, supra note 6, at 32. 
 58. See also supra note 38 (discussing Blackstone’s preference for “missed 
convictions”).  
 59. Because it is considered better, for example, to incorrectly suspect someone of 
having a prohibited weapon and subject them to further screening, than to miss a 
prohibited weapon. 
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To illustrate this, consider again Table 4(ii) for a classic 
problem of forensic inference of source. The two available courses 
of action (i.e., decisions) can be denoted as follows: 
d1: “report that the fingermark comes from Mr. A” 
d2: “do not report that the fingermark comes from Mr. A” 
Each of these decisions can lead to exactly one desirable and 
one undesirable outcome. That is: 
— when deciding d1, the conclusion that the fingermark 
comes from Mr. A is correct if the fingermark truly comes 
from Mr. A (i.e., proposition Hp is true); it is erroneous 
when in fact an unknown person is the source of the 
fingermark (i.e., proposition Hd is true).60 
— when deciding d2, not concluding that the fingermark 
comes from Mr. A is correct if the fingermark truly comes 
an unknown person (i.e., proposition Hd is true); it is 
erroneous when in fact Mr. A is the source of the 
fingermark (i.e., proposition Hp is true). 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical Summary61 of the Notions of Decisions, States of 
Nature, and Decision Consequences (Outcomes) for a Two-
Decision/Two-State-of-Nature Problem, Such As Forensic 
Identification, Sketched in Table 4(ii). 
 
Because all evidence is inherently probabilistic, the evidence 
(in the case of the fingermark images themselves) alone does not 
give us enough information to decide to behave as if that Mr. A 
 
 60. For an explanation of the nomenclature using Hp and Hd, see supra note 48. 
 61. This kind of representation is also known as decision tree. HOWARD RAIFFA, 
DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY 10 
(Frederick Mosteller ed., 1968). The particular example shown here in Figure 1 is adapted 
with slight modification from Alex Biedermann & Joëlle Vuille, Understanding the Logic of 
Forensic Identification Decisions (Without Numbers), 83 SUI GENERIS 397, 402 (2018). 
correct identification
false identification
false non-identification
correct non-identification
d1 (“identify”)
d2 (“do not 
identify”)
Hp: Fingermark comes from Mr. A
Hd: Fingermark comes from an
unknown person
decisions states of nature outcomes
Hp: Fingermark comes from Mr. A
Hd: Fingermark comes from an
unknown person
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(Hp) rather than an unknown person (Hd) is the source of the 
fingermark. Virtually all real-world evidence is inherently 
incomplete, hence incapable to support one hypothesis over the 
other with total certainty. 
However, as we discussed supra, there is an additional 
consideration that is often overlooked. The potentially adverse 
consequence associated with d1, an incorrect decision of same 
source, is considered by many worse than the potentially adverse 
consequence associated with d2, an incorrect decision not to 
identify Mr. A. Because the decision-maker does not know the 
ground truth, the decision-maker does not know which of the two 
possible consequences, depicted in Figure 1, will follow each of the 
two possible decisions. So, what can decision-makers do when they 
cannot be sure about the actual consequence incurred following 
decisions d1 and d2? 
The first point to note is that not knowing which consequence 
will be incurred means that one also does not know—at the time 
of making the decision—the actual reward (or loss) incurred. What 
decision-makers can instead consider—and decision theory 
formalizes this explicitly—is the expected utility (loss). The 
expected utility EU (loss, EL) is obtained by weighing the utility 
U (loss, L) of each decision consequence by the probability Pr of its 
occurrence and summing these probability-weighted utilities 
(losses). Slightly more formally, we can write this as follows: 
EU(d1) = U(correct identification) x Pr(Fingermark comes 
from Mr. A) + U(false identification) x Pr(Fingermark comes 
from an unknown person), and 
EU(d2) = U(missed identification) x Pr(Fingermark comes 
from Mr. A) + U(correct nonidentification) x Pr(Fingermark 
comes from an unknown person). 
The expected utility (loss) thus characterizes the rival 
decisions and provides a criterion for their comparison. Further, 
the so-called maximum (minimum) expected utility (loss) principle 
says that the optimal decision is the one which has the maximum 
(minimum) expected utility (loss).62 
The full numerical development of the above notions is not 
necessary for the general arguments we seek to advance and goes 
beyond the scope of this Article.63 The essential points of the 
 
 62. Despite the use of the same words, this should not be confused with the well-
known minimax criterion. See infra note 65. 
 63. As emphasized by Howard, “The overall aim of decision analysis is insight, not 
numbers.” Ronald A. Howard, An Assessment of Decision Analysis, 28 OPERATIONS RES. 4, 
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decision theoretic analysis of the “problem” of identification are 
the following:64 
— Decision-makers are only in control of the decisions to be 
made (i.e., the branches on the left-hand side in Figure 1); 
they are not in control over decision outcomes (i.e., the 
end-points on the right-hand side in Figure 1). 
— A decision is made not only on the basis of what one thinks 
is (most) probably true, but also based on one’s preferences 
among decision outcomes. 
— There is a difference between a good outcome and a good 
decision: since one cannot decide such that the outcome 
will be optimal (i.e., the best outcome for a given decision) 
for sure, one can at best select the decision that offers the 
best prospect with regards to the relative desirability of 
the various decision outcomes (i.e., the decision with the 
maximum/minimum expected utility/loss).65 
The operational precept that derives from the above 
principles can, without going into the details of the full numerical 
development, be summarized as follows: 
“Suppose that Option One has far worse consequences if 
wrong than does Option Two. Then a sensible decision-
maker will choose Option One rather than Option Two only 
if she has a high degree of confidence that Option One rather 
than Option Two is correct, or, put another way, only if she 
thinks Option One is far more probable than Option Two.”66 
As an illustration, consider again the case of a fingermark 
found to show similarities and differences with respect to a 
fingerprint of Mr. A. Even though (i) one may have strong evidence 
in support of the proposition that Mr. A is the source of the 
fingermark (Hp), rather than an unknown person (Hd); and (ii) 
after consideration of all the evidence, the decision-maker’s 
probability for Hp is much higher than that for the proposition Hd, 
this does not imply or suggest that the optimal decision is to 
identify Mr. A as the source of the fingermark (i.e., decide d1). 
Indeed, if the loss associated with an erroneous identification of 
 
9 (1980). 
 64. E.g., Biedermann et al., supra note 40. 
 65. Note that other, nonprobabilistic decision criteria exist, such as the minimax 
decision rule, though they may render forensic identification unworkable. Biedermann et 
al., supra note 55, at 300–03. 
 66. Friedman, supra note 44, at 1590.  
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Mr. A as the source of the fingermark is considerably greater than 
the loss associated with a missed identification (i.e., deciding d2 
when in fact Hp is true), identifying Mr. A as the source of the 
fingermark (decision d1) may not be the optimal decision.67 
Put another way, using the terminology discussed in Part I, 
the decision-maker’s opinion may be that Mr. A is the source of the 
fingermark. But even a decision-maker holding such an opinion 
might decide to behave as if Mr. A is not the source of the mark, 
solely because the potential losses for an incorrect same-source 
decision are so great. 
These are examples of the possibility we mentioned supra,68 
in which it may be rational for a decision-maker to decide to 
behave as if a proposition is true even when the decision-maker 
considers the proposition less probable than its alternative. 
These qualitative statements of decision theoretic advice for 
deciding between competing courses of action should sound 
uncontroversial to scientists and legal specialists. Indeed, even 
without referring explicitly to decision theory, it is commonly 
upheld as a precept that relative losses associated with adverse 
decision consequences should be “weighted” against one’s 
strengths of beliefs about what the actual state of the world is (or 
will turn out to be).69 Decision theory provides a formal 
justification for this intuition. 
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF ULTRS 
A. Preliminaries 
While the draft ULTRs were quite heterogeneous, the 
Approved ULTRs are remarkably similar to one another. It is 
reasonable to suppose that the first published ULTR, for latent 
prints, provided the template from which the others were 
adapted.70 Below is a typical passage from an ULTR with the 
relationship between the words “decision” and “conclusion” 
 
 67. For numerical examples, see, for example, Biedermann et al., The 
Decisionalization, supra note 6, at 35–36. 
 68. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 69. See STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN 
APPROACH 481 (Marcia J. Horton et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010) (“The right thing to do—the 
rational decision—therefore depends on both the relative importance of various goals and 
the likelihood that, and degree to which, they will be achieved.”). 
 70. See Simon A. Cole, Forensics, Justice, and the Case for Science-Based Decision 
Making, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Nov. 14, 2018, 10:01 AM), https://blog.ucsusa.org/ 
science-blogger/forensics-justice-and-the-case-for-science-based-decision-making [https://p 
erma.cc/YCY4-3T7Z].  
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highlighted. For illustrative purposes, we have chosen one of the 
two ULTRs for the forensic firearm and toolmark discipline. 
‘Source identification’ is an examiner’s conclusion that two 
toolmarks originated from the same source. This 
conclusion is an examiner’s decision that all observed 
class characteristics are in agreement and the quality and 
quantity of corresponding individual characteristics is such 
that the examiner would not expect to find that same 
combination of individual characteristics repeated in 
another source and has found insufficient disagreement of 
individual characteristics to conclude they originated from 
different sources. 
The basis for a ‘source identification’ conclusion is an 
examiner’s decision that the observed class characteristics 
and corresponding individual characteristics provide 
extremely strong support for the proposition that the two 
toolmarks came from the same source and extremely weak 
support for the proposition that the two toolmarks came from 
different sources. 
A ‘source identification’ is the statement of an examiner’s 
opinion (an inductive inference) that the probability that 
the two toolmarks were made by different sources is so small 
that it is negligible. A ‘source identification’ is not based upon 
a statistically-derived or verified measurement or an actual 
comparison to all firearms or toolmarks in the world.71 
Nine of the ten ULTRs that use the term “decision” posit the same 
structural relationship between the “decision” and the 
“conclusion” using almost the exact same words.72 This common 
structure consists of three paragraphs. It is not clear to us whether 
the paragraphs are supposed to represent a progression of 
arguments or to offer three different ways of saying the same 
thing, but we tend to think the latter is more plausible. 
Elsewhere, one Author has already criticized this language as 
it appeared in the latent print ULTR.73 The primary criticism was 
that the ULTR remained a “categorical” (or nonprobabilistic) 
statement: “two toolmarks originated from the same source.”74 
However, this nonprobabilistic statement was followed by a 
 
 71. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR 
THE FORENSIC FIREARMS/TOOLMARKS DISCIPLINE – PATTERN MATCH EXAMINATION 2 (2018) 
(emphasis added).  
 72. See supra Tables 1 and 2. The exception is chemistry. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS FOR GENERAL FORENSIC CHEMISTRY 
AND SEIZED DRUG EXAMINATIONS (2019). 
 73. Cole, supra note 28, at 1113–19. 
 74. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 71, at 2. 
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number of probabilistic statements that purported to support the 
nonprobabilistic statement.75 That doesn’t make sense.76  
Although broad criticisms of the latent print ULTR have 
already been made, in this Article we go more deeply into the 
issues with the use of the word “decision” in that ULTR and the 
eight additional ULTRs that closely follow its wording. We cannot, 
however, analyze and discuss the notion of decision in a deliberate 
way without a (scientific) reference point. With respect to the 
notion of decision, the reference framework on which we shall rely 
is given by the decision theoretic notions introduced in Sections 
III.A–III.C. 
B. Descriptive Analysis of ULTR Contents 
We start by unraveling the contents of the ULTRs regarding 
source identification. In essence, the first paragraph makes two 
assertions, referred to as decisions. First, it is said that the 
conclusion “is” a decision that the observed features are “in 
agreement.”77 The second assertion is more intricate and 
convoluted: it is the decision that the “examiner would not expect 
to find that same combination of individual characteristics 
repeated in another source.”78 What is not clear with this second 
assertion is whether it means to say: 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Cole, supra note 28, at 1113–19. We suspect that the authors of the ULTRs are 
“probabilistically aware,” making an oblique reference to the notion of criminals who are 
“forensically aware.” BOB WOFFINDEN, THE NICHOLAS CASES: CASUALTIES OF JUSTICE 179, 
181, 185–89 (2016). They are aware of statisticians’ criticisms of categorical statements. 
Therefore, they include some statements alluding to probabilistic notions, but still are not 
willing to delete the categorical statements. As we shall see, the author(s) of the ULTRs 
also appear to be “decisionally aware.” 
 77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 71, at 2.  
 78. Id. As an aside, the expression “individual characteristics” is problematic for two 
reasons: first, one may wonder how one can know that characteristics are individual (unless 
one treats this assertion as an assumption), and second, if characteristics are indeed 
individual, then the question is why there is discussion about duplication in another source. 
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i. that the probability79 of seeing the features on the 
questioned item given that they have been left by another 
source is (very) low (i.e., paraphrasing the expression 
“would not expect to find”), or 
ii. that, given the observed features on the questioned item, 
the probability that an unknown source would be found 
to leave features of the observed kind is (very) low. 
The reader might be tempted to think that interpretations i 
and ii are virtually the same and that we are splitting hairs here. 
However, note that strictly speaking, they express different 
aspects. Assertion i is focusing on the probability Pr of the 
observations E given that an unknown source left the mark 
(proposition Hd): i.e., Pr(E|Hd). Assertion ii refers to the 
probability of an unknown source being able to leave marks of the 
observed kind. But note that this is not a classic alternative source 
proposition of the kind “the mark comes from an unknown source.” 
It is a proposition that incorporates observations made (i.e., a 
proposition of the kind “an unknown source presents the features 
of interest”): this is an amalgam of a source level proposition and 
observations made.80 So, while interpretation i focuses on the 
findings given the proposition, interpretation ii pertains to a 
proposition colored by knowledge of the findings (i.e., the focus is 
on another source with said features). The “would not expect” 
expression thus is, at least, unclear. In the worst case, it is 
confusing because the probability of an unknown source having 
said features is prone to be misinterpreted as the probability of an 
unknown source having left the observed features on the 
questioned item. 
As an aside, the expression “not expect to find” itself raises a 
host of questions, in particular how scientists come to think that 
they do “not expect to find,” an expression that calls for empirical 
and quantifiable grounds.81 
In the second paragraph it is said that a decision that the 
likelihood ratio82 (LR) is some very high number (i.e., that it is far 
 
 79. Using phraseology centered on the term “expectation,” the first ULTR paragraph 
eloquently avoids the term probability. Here we make the assumption that expectation, in 
essence, invokes the notion of probability for we do not see what else it could invoke.  
 80. For a discussion of the problematic nature of such propositions, see Tacha Hicks 
et al., The Importance of Distinguishing Information from Evidence/Observations When 
Formulating Propositions, 55 SCI. & JUST. 520 (2015). 
 81. See, for example, concerns expressed in the letter from Rush D. Holt, Chief Exec. 
Officer, Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci., to Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney Gen., 
U.S. Dep't of Justice (Mar. 26, 2018).  
 82. Here we make the assumption that the notion of “[strong] support” refers to a 
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more probable to see the observed evidence if the marks come from 
the same source than if they come from different sources) forms 
the “basis” for the conclusion.83 
In the third paragraph, it is said that a source identification 
“is” an opinion (which is an inference) that the probability of the 
defense hypothesis is very low. More formally, this is an assertion 
of the kind Pr(Hd|•), that is the probability Pr of the proposition 
Hd, stating that “the two toolmarks were made by different 
sources.”84 This looks incomplete, however, because one does not 
usually hold a probability (or state of mind, belief, etc.) in isolation. 
Instead, a probabilistic statement is conditioned upon 
information, knowledge, and evidence available at the time a 
person issues a probabilistic statement. Presumably, thus, in the 
case here, the probability is conditioned on the observations made 
(E, short for evidence in our notation) and task-relevant 
conditioning information I. But, given the unclear meaning of the 
ULTR on this aspect, we use the generic notation “•.” The formal 
notation helps us clarify that paragraph three, with its focus on 
Pr(Hd|•), is fundamentally different from the focus of paragraphs 
one (with its tentative interpretation as Pr(E|Hd)) and two (LR). 
A further aspect of concern with paragraph three, besides its focus 
on a proposition H rather than on the finding E, is that it makes 
an unsubstantiated assessment and deliberate choice: that is, it 
asserts not only that the probability Pr(Hd|•) is “small”—an 
assertion openly devoid of a statistical basis and not “verified” by 
any other means—but also small enough to be considered 
“negligible.”85 The latter assertion opens a host of interrogations, 
such as how an examiner may come to the conclusion that a 
probability is sufficiently small to be considered negligible and 
justify such a conclusion. Vagueness on this point also raises 
doubts as to the possibility of ensuring that such assessments will 
be made consistently across different examiners. Paradoxically, 
this tends to compromise the ULTR as a whole: its intention to 
ensure the eponymous “uniformity” in reporting language does not 
have any counterpart in assuring consistency in the process of 
figuring out when exactly a given uniform reporting expression is 
 
likelihood ratio, which is a reference measure for strength of evidential support. E.g., COLIN 
G.G. AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR 
FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 7 (2d ed. 2004). 
 83. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 71, at 2.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
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to be used in any given case at hand.86 We will elaborate further 
on this aspect in the next Section. 
Lastly, paragraph three does not use the term “decision.” We 
will not discuss it further at this point, but we will, however, note 
that it follows the same form as the other two paragraphs: it claims 
that a nonprobabilistic statement “is” a statement that a 
probability87 is very low.88 So, it follows the same pattern of 
advocating that experts round purportedly low probabilities down 
to zero probabilities for fact-finder consumption.89 
The ULTRs, then, display a lack of clarity that makes them 
difficult to interpret from a statistical point of view. This might not 
be viewed as a problem if comprehensibility to that particular 
discipline is not perceived as a problem. But the ULTRs appear to 
invoke statistical concepts and use statistical terms. If so, 
statisticians should be able to easily understand at least what the 
ULTRs are claiming. But our argument in the next Section is that 
no matter how one interprets these semantic ambiguities, the 
ULTRs suffer from fundamental flaws in reasoning. 
C. ULTRs Read from a Decision-Analytic Viewpoint 
We will argue that the ULTRs’ use of the term “decision” is 
problematic for two primary reasons. 
First, they invert decision theory by treating decisions as 
inputs into the reasoning process, rather than outputs. The 
outputs of their proposed reasoning processes are phrased as 
“conclusions,” rather than “decisions.” This falsely suggests that 
examiners can know the true state of nature—whether an object 
is, or is not, the source of a trace. 
Second, they have examiners “deciding” probabilities, rather 
than “assigning” them. Though there is, in theory, a decision 
theoretic sense in which a probability can be understood as a 
decision,90 it inevitably invokes the notion of preference (i.e., a 
score) and ULTR provides no guidance as to whether, and if so, 
how, examiners shall cope with this notion. 
 
 86. Defenders of ULTR may argue that consistency in proceedings across examiners 
is not a stated aim of ULTR.  
 87. We use the expression “a probability” here because, following our comments 
above, the ULTR refers to different types of probability (e.g., probability of the evidence as 
compared to probability of a proposition). 
 88. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 71, at 2.  
 89. Cole, supra note 28, at 1116–18.  
 90. Alex Biedermann & Joëlle Vuille, The Decisional Nature of Probability and 
Plausibility Assessments in Juridical Evidence and Proof, 16 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 
1, 25–31 (2018). 
57 HOUS. L. REV. 551 (2020) 
580 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [57:3 
1. Inverting Decision Theory. Table 5 graphically compares 
the structural position of “decision” in the ULTRs’ template format 
and posited reasoning process with classical decision theory. 
Stages in roman type are assigned to the expert and stages in italic 
type are assigned to the fact-finder. Squared brackets are used to 
designate stages of the reasoning process that we consider to be 
stipulated by ULTR, though not actually formally stated.91 
Table 5. Comparison of the Posited ULTR Reasoning Process 
(Columns 1 and 2) and Inference of Source in the Classic Decision 
Theoretic Sense (Column 3). 
ULTR ¶1 ULTR ¶2 Decision Theory 
[Express 
expectation (i.e., 
assign 
probability)] 
→ decide 
expectation 
(probability) + 
decide 
agreement 
→ conclude 
source 
[Assign 
probabilities 
→ obtain 
likelihood ratio]  
→ decide 
likelihood ratio 
→ conclude 
source 
 
Assign probabilities to 
findings 
→ obtain likelihood ratio  
→ consider probability of 
competing propositions of 
interest (given all the 
evidence and 
information) and 
possible decision 
consequences 
→ consider preferences 
among decision 
consequences 
→ decide source [i.e., 
same vs. different source]  
— Steps in squared brackets are inferred from but not explicitly mentioned in ULTRs. 
— Roman type steps designate tasks commonly considered to be in the realm of the 
experts’ competence. 
— Steps in italics are tasks that we consider to be in the fact-finders’ area of 
competence. The term “decide” is bolded whenever used. 
 
Table 5 shows that in the ULTRs, the role of decisions in the 
reasoning process is completely inverted from their role in decision 
theory. For decision theory, a decision is the final step—the 
 
 91. Note that ULTRs are limited to descriptions of (reporting) conclusions. ULTRs 
provide no directions as to the (reasoning) processes that lead to particular conclusions. 
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output—of the decision-analytic process:92 one cannot come to an 
appraisal of the decision options, and choose among them, before 
thinking through the probabilities and assessing the relative 
(un)desirability of the various possible decision outcomes.93 The 
ULTRs, however, assert that a decision forms the “basis” for the 
conclusion. The output of the ULTRs are conclusions, and 
decisions are inputs. Contrast this with the view of decision theory 
where the output is decisions. The whole purpose of decision 
theory is to elaborate procedures that specify how to arrive at 
decisions. The crucial point of the decision theoretic view is that 
one does not “conclude”—if by “conclude,” one means “know”—that 
something is the source of a given toolmark: one can only “decide” 
to behave or proceed as if something is the source of the toolmark. 
The ULTRs ignore this essential insight of decision theory and 
instead claim not only that conclusions about source based solely 
on the evidence are possible, but that they can be “based on” of all 
things: decisions. 
If we refer back to the simple flooding illustration we outlined 
above,94 the ULTRs would seem to invert the decision-making 
process as follows: 
1. I decide that it is twice as likely that it will NOT flood as 
that it will flood. 
2. I conclude that it will NOT flood. 
Notice that here, in point (2), the ULTR has claimed to arrive 
at a state of complete knowledge about the ground-truth 
proposition: it will not flood. Consider also the strangeness of 
thinking that one can decide whether it will flood, as opposed to 
either (i) deciding whether to behave as if it will flood; or (ii) 
assigning a probability to the event of flooding! In a decision 
theoretic perspective, one will show far more humility. The 
decision-maker will acknowledge that she cannot know for certain 
whether it will flood or not, but, nonetheless, the decision-maker 
can rationally decide whether to close the university even under 
 
 92. See supra Part III. Of course, a decision regarding source is rarely the end of the 
matter. There are a host of further (even concurrent) decision points following up. For 
example, at the stage of the verdict, a decision regarding the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant needs to be made, followed by a decision regarding the type of sentence (fine, 
etc.). 
 93. See supra Part III. It is possible, though, to analyze a decision ex-post and make 
statements about the decision ingredients (i.e., probabilities and utilities/losses) that a 
coherent decision-maker ought to have (had), but this is of little practical interest. All 
practical decision problems are ex-ante decision problems. 
 94. See supra Section III.A.  
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this condition of uncertainty. She will do so by giving due 
consideration to her strength of belief in the event of flooding and 
to the relative desirability of the decision consequences. 
Notice also that in the ULTRs’ process, the action—opening 
or closing the university—seems to have vanished. This illustrates 
an important aspect of decision theory: it is driven by the need for 
action (keep the university open or close it) rather than the quest 
for truth itself. The relative probability of the propositions is of 
interest in decision theory only in the service of choosing an action. 
Decision theory begins with the behavioral problem—what is the 
action I shall take? It then tries to gather information about the 
truth of propositions in order to solve that behavioral problem of 
how to act in the light of inevitable uncertainty. 
The ULTRs, on the other hand, display the traditional 
mindset that the goal of analysis is to determine which proposition 
is true. If one truly has determined the truth, then one does not 
need decision theory: the behavioral choice is obvious.95 But the 
problem is that in real-world circumstances regarding legal 
disputes one can rarely determine the truth of contested events 
(i.e., competing propositions). The above flooding example makes 
this particularly clear. We all understand intuitively that we 
cannot “decide” that it will not flood and expect nature always to 
comply. We even know that we cannot “conclude” that it will not 
flood—even based on rich scientific information—and expect 
nature always to comply, hence the familiar phenomenon of 
closing universities on days on which it never does flood. The 
ULTRs have lost sight of the behavioral problem that stimulated 
our interest in truth in the first place. The decision we have to 
make is not whether it will flood—we understand intuitively that 
is out of our control. The decision we have to make is whether we 
should close the university. To make this decision rationally, we 
need to make our best assessment regarding the truth of the 
proposition of interest (whether or not it will flood). In decision 
theory, asserting or pinning down the probability of flooding is not 
the end but rather a means toward making a rational decision. 
Carrying this difference of approach over to forensic 
identification, we might observe the following: the goal of the 
ULTRs is to determine whether the defendant is the source of the 
trace. The goal of using decision theory is to decide whether or not 
to behave as if the defendant is the source of the trace, followed by 
 
 95. That is, if we knew there would be flooding, we would close the university; if we 
knew there would not be flooding, we would leave the university open. Stated otherwise, if 
we knew which state of nature would come about, we would know which decision to make 
in order to obtain the best consequence possible under the respective state of nature. 
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further action of legal nature. The ULTRs describe a method in 
which the forensic scientist would spuriously convince herself that 
a state of certainty has been achieved about the source of the trace. 
Decision theory, in contrast, seeks to develop a way to act “under 
uncertainty,” as decision theorists say—that is, despite one’s 
awareness that one is uncertain—and will always be uncertain—
about the true source of the trace. Thus, decision theory would 
approach the problem as follows: “I must decide whether to 
consider the defendant being the source of the fingermark, rather 
than an unknown person. In order to make this decision, it is 
useful to try to assess, as best I can, the relative probabilities with 
which each of the two possible decisions may lead to undesirable 
outcomes.” 
Decision theory describes a process of using information to 
make a decision under uncertainty. The ULTRs, in contrast, 
describe a process of making decisions to (purportedly) achieve a 
state of certainty, which makes no sense. 
2. Deciding Probabilities? In addition, the ULTRs twice 
suggest that examiners “decide” probabilities. This is peculiar 
wording. A suitable term that statisticians may use here is 
“assign,” although other terms may also be used. Examples depend 
heavily on the context of applications, but may include “assess,” 
“define,” “ascribe,” “estimate,” or “compute.” However, “decide” fits 
uneasily with probability. To “assign” a probability is a statement 
about one’s belief about the truth of a proposition. To decide is to 
make a choice. It makes sense for me to decide whether to eat a 
burger made of meat or a vegetable burger. That decision does not 
really require any cognition about the truth of any proposition. It 
is merely choice. It also makes sense for me, when presented with 
a burger to assign a probability to the proposition that the burger 
contains meat. But it makes little linguistic sense for me to say 
that I am going to “decide” the truth of the proposition that a 
burger contains meat merely by looking at it. 
In paragraph 1, the ULTR has the examiner deciding whether 
the class features are in agreement. This raises the question of 
why the examiner should “decide” this instead of, say, “observing,” 
“judging” or, if she has the tools to do so, “determining” it. Though 
it is not impossible, in principle, to consider the assessment of 
“agreement” as a decision, doing so formally would require—
following the theory exposed in Section III.C—value judgments for 
the various consequences of deciding agreement (i.e., accurate and 
inaccurate determinations) and, again, probabilities. These 
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requirements offer as much room for debate as their counterparts 
do in the context of considering source (attribution) as a decision.96 
Then the ULTR has the examiner deciding that the 
probability of the defense hypothesis is low. At first glance, it 
sounds improper to “decide” a probability. A probability is what it 
is. Generally, it is not subject to preference, and therefore, it is not 
“decided.” Nonetheless, there is a formal decision theoretic 
approach to understanding probability,97 though there is no 
indication in the ULTR that presupposes this formal approach. 
In paragraph 2, the ULTR has the examiner deciding that the 
likelihood ratio98 is enormously high or, in the words of ULTR, that 
the findings “provide extremely strong support.”99 Again, the word 
“decision” looks unsuitable in this context, for at least two reasons. 
First, because a likelihood ratio is not to be decided about. A 
likelihood ratio is obtained as a direct result of two conditional 
probabilities that have been assigned individually. Once these two 
component probabilities have been set, the likelihood ratio (i.e., its 
order of magnitude) follows by definition. There is nothing else to 
be decided. What is more, the term “deciding” in this context 
suggests that the value of evidence (i.e., likelihood ratio) 
assessments are one-off conclusions; they are not. It would be a 
misconception to think that an examiner could come up, out of the 
void, with a statement of the kind “I decide that my likelihood ratio 
is so and so” (or “I decide that the findings provide such and such 
strength of support”). Instead, the proper application of a logical 
approach to evaluative reporting requires the scientist to think 
about the observations given each of the competing propositions in 
turn. It is only afterwards that, by combining the component 
assessments, the likelihood ratio (or strength of the evidence) is 
found. But this latter stage follows merely by necessity (i.e., as the 
ratio of the two component assessments); it requires no further 
intervention or a decision of any kind. 
Second, a likelihood ratio (or, more generally, an expression 
of strength of support) by itself cannot logically warrant a source 
identification conclusion. It is possible, however, to consider 
whether the likelihood ratio at hand exceeds the minimum value 
necessary to warrant identification decisions given particular 
assumptions about other factors, such as probabilities for 
 
 96. See supra Section III.B. 
 97. See supra note 90; infra Section IV.D.  
 98. Recall that we interpret here the ULTR expression “provid[ing] . . . support” as 
referring to the likelihood ratio. See supra note 82. 
 99. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 71, at 2.   
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competing propositions based on considerations other than the 
scientist’s evidence and loss ratios for adverse consequences of 
identification decisions.100 But, again, the rationale for these 
considerations derives from the full decision theoretic approach 
and there are no indications in ULTR that “deciding” the 
likelihood ratio is understood in this way. 
Of course, decision theory does not possess a monopoly over 
the word “decision.” It is, of course, possible—and following our 
analysis the most likely explanation—that the ULTRs are using 
the term “decision” in its colloquial sense. Given the extensive 
forensic literature on the use of the decision theory, we believe the 
ULTRs have a responsibility to at least clarify whether they intend 
to invoke that literature or not. But even using “decision” in its 
colloquial sense, it is improper for the expert to be “deciding” 
probabilities without a clear view of what exactly this means, and 
what “deciding probabilities” means in other, more formal 
theoretical frameworks (i.e., decision theory). 
D. A Coherent Way of Deciding Probabilities 
We have argued in the preceding Section that it is peculiar to 
think of deciding probabilities. Strictly speaking, it is possible to 
decide probabilities in a coherent way. However, the theory of 
considering probability as a decision is rather specialized and 
advanced, which makes it doubtful that ULTRs intend to embrace 
it.101 Specifically, if the theory of understanding of probability as a 
decision were indeed endorsed, then examiners should not be 
allowed to make assertions that imply (or suggest) that a small 
probability can be rounded off to zero, as stipulated for example by 
ULTR ¶1.102 Simply put, examiners could not defensibly claim that 
it is suitable to intentionally report a smaller probability than the 
one they actually have in mind. The reason for this stems from the 
concept of proper scoring rules, that is a type of score103 function 
that measures the “goodness” of probability assertions with the 
particular property that it is optimal for a probability assessor to 
 
 100. See, e.g., Biedermann et al., The Decisionalization, supra note 6, at 36 tbl. 4. 
 101. See, e.g., Biedermann & Vuille, supra note 90 passim (discussing the relevance of 
this theory for applications in forensic science and the law). 
 102. For a full development of this argument, see, for example, Alex Biedermann et 
al., The Subjectivist Interpretation of Probability and the Problem of Individualisation in 
Forensic Science, 53 SCI. & JUST. 192 (2013). 
 103. A score can be thought of as a penalty that is smaller (greater) the closer (farther 
away) an asserted probability lies from the actual truth-value of a proposition. For example, 
the closer an asserted probability is to one (zero) for a proposition that is actually true 
(false), the smaller (greater) the score (penalty).  
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report probabilities that correspond to what the person actually 
believes. Stated otherwise, under a proper scoring rule the 
question of which probability to report is treated as a decision, and 
the theory shows that the optimal104 decision (i.e., the probability 
to be reported) is none other than the one that corresponds to one’s 
actual probabilistic belief. Since the middle of the last century, this 
feature has been largely explored in fields involving expert 
assessments made under uncertainty, using probabilities.105 It has 
also been the object of intense study by statisticians.106 The scoring 
rule scheme is of interest from an operational point of view 
because it encourages experts to state their actual beliefs as 
probabilities, i.e., encourages honest probability reporting and 
discourages the reporting of distorted probabilities. In this sense, 
the theory that views probability assertion as a decision looks 
relevant to the ULTRs’ suggestion that examiners “decide 
probabilities,” though there are hurdles from an applied 
perspective, because scoring rules are subtle and intricate.107 The 
challenging nature of the scoring rule is even admitted by founding 
writers on the topic, such as Savage: “[T]he subject must 
understand the scoring rule. . . . [M]ost ordinary people will not 
understand it at all; and even those with mathematical training 
may not be nearly apt enough at calculation to use the rule 
effectively.”108 For these reasons, it appears nonfeasible to require 
examiners to strictly adhere to understanding probability 
assignment as a decision. For practical purposes, the idea that a 
probability relies, inherently, on a personalized assessment—
given the best knowledge, information and evidence available at 
the time an assessment needs to be made—can suitably be 
expressed by the notion of “probability assignment” (i.e., 
“assigning” a probability). At the same time, the important point 
to keep in mind is that a probability is supposed to reflect the 
assigner’s true beliefs about the truth or falsity of the event. 
 
 104. In the context here, a decision is optimal if it has the minimum expected score. 
 105. E.g., Glenn W. Brier, Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability, 
78 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 1 (1950). 
 106. E.g., Bruno de Finetti, The Proper Approach to Probability, in EXCHANGEABILITY 
IN PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 1, 1–3 (G. Koch & K. Spizzichino eds., 1982); Leonard J. 
Savage, Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations, 66 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 783 
(1971).  
 107. Further, the understanding of probability as a decision may be considered 
debatable in this context of application because it requires value judgments for decision 
consequences. Here, the consequence of a “decided” probability is its distance to the truth-
value of the uncertain proposition, and the value judgment is operationalized through the 
score. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
 108. Savage, supra note 106, at 799. 
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In short, we argue that the ULTRs misuse the term “decision,” 
whether it is intended in the technical or the colloquial sense. But 
that does not mean that the term cannot be useful in thinking 
about forensic problems. Indeed, it can be. In the next Part, we 
explain how. 
V. APPLYING DECISION THEORY 
We argued above that decision theory can be useful in 
conceptualizing key features of legal problems involving forensic 
evidence. In this Part, we expand on that argument. 
As we argued in Part III, decision theory offers a way of 
coherently thinking about making a decision when presented with 
competing propositions, such as: (i) Mr. A is the source of this 
fingermark; and (ii) an unknown person is the source of this 
fingermark. Decision theory is typically applied in situations in 
which the available evidence is insufficient to know for certain 
which of these propositions is true. But decision theory offers a 
way to logically decide to behave as if one of them is true. In other 
words, decision theory offers a way to decide which hypothesis (or 
proposition) to endorse. 
Decision theory demonstrates what would be required to 
make such a rational decision. Not surprisingly, some kind of 
analysis of the evidence is required. In addition, as statisticians 
have long pointed out, prior odds are required too.109 The primary 
contribution of decision theory then is to articulate that some sort 
of statement of preferences between different consequences, 
leading to expected utilities or losses (allowing the decision-maker 
to qualify and compare rival decisions), is also required.110 
For legal actors, decision theory can thus be useful in laying 
out the logical requirements necessary to behave as if a statement 
such as “Mr. A is the source of this fingermark” is true. The 
decision to behave as if such a statement is true is of obvious 
pertinence in legal proceedings. Decision theory can, in theory, 
articulate the steps toward getting there, though this way is paved 
with a host of questions that we briefly address below. 
In articulating the reasoning process behind such decision 
statements, decision theory exposes some serious concerns with 
common legal practice in handling forensic evidence in the United 
States and abroad. The principal such concern is that decision 
statements such as “Mr. A is the source of this fingermark” are 
 
 109. E.g., G. Parmigiani, Decision Theory: Bayesian, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 3327, 3330–31 (Neil J. Smelser & 
Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). 
 110. Biedermann et al., supra note 55, at 302–04. 
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often––in some cases always––made by experts. This practice has 
been criticized based on a number of different arguments. Some 
legal actors may have a vague sense that it is wrong but have 
difficulty articulating what is wrong about it. We feel that decision 
theory has the potential to help more clearly articulate what is 
wrong with this practice. 
As explained above, a decision is based on preferences among 
the possible decision outcomes (consequences). In forensic 
problems, these consequences tend to lie in the realm of adducing 
evidence against an innocent person or failing to adduce evidence 
against a liable person. A moment’s reflection should quickly lead 
to the realization that the relevant preferences ought not to be the 
expert’s preferences. The question of how much we prefer failing to 
adduce evidence against a guilty person versus adducing evidence 
against an innocent person (or vice versa) is clearly better suited 
to a legal actor, such as the fact-finder, than to the forensic expert. 
This is because a forensic scientist does not have expertise in the 
moral considerations that would underlie these preferences. Nor 
does the forensic scientist have the moral authority to set these 
preferences. One can imagine these preferences being made 
society-wide, and one can imagine them being made in individual 
cases by juries.111 But it is clear that forensic scientists possess no 
special expertise or moral authority that justifies using their 
preferences rather than the fact-finder’s. As Dr. Stoney has noted, 
conventional practice in fingerprint analysis has included 
“assuming priors and including decision-making preferences. This 
created an overwhelming and unrealistic burden, asking 
fingerprint examiners, in the name of science, for something that 
science cannot provide. As a necessary consequence, fingerprint 
examiners became unscientific.”112 
The logical consequence of this is that experts ought not make 
decisions. And, the logical consequences of that, by definition, is 
that they ought not make categorical statements like “Mr. A. is the 
source of this fingermark.” 
What, then, are experts supposed to do? They are, first of all, 
supposed to focus on the immediate results of their practical work, 
which are—strictly speaking—observations. They are not 
supposed to focus on statements about propositions regarding the 
source of marks and traces. They are supposed to evaluate their 
observations, if introduced as evidence, using their particular 
 
 111. But even on these general levels, it is far from clear how those preferences ought 
to be framed, let alone whether—for practical purposes—they actually can be framed.  
 112. David A. Stoney, Discussion, Quantifying the Weight of Evidence from a Forensic 
Fingerprint Comparison: A New Paradigm, 175 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 371, 400 (2012). 
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expertise, and inform the decision-maker about the probity of that 
evidence with respect to the different competing propositions. To 
be clear, the emphasis here is on the value of the findings with 
respect to propositions, not the reverse. It is the decision-maker 
who then needs to take that evidence further to render a decision 
to behave as if a proposition is true, based on their appreciation of 
what is at stake in the case at hand (i.e., their preference 
structure).113 
We are aware that our argument may sound disempowering 
to forensic experts. There is ample evidence that forensic scientists 
believe that failing to report what forensic statisticians call 
“posterior probabilities” (e.g., Mr. A is the source of the trace) 
renders them less useful to the justice system. As one example, 
consider this remark by a forensic hair analyst reported in the root 
cause analysis review of overstatement of the value of microscopic 
hair comparison analysis evidence at the FBI: “[y]ou cannot leave 
the jury hanging or you sound like a meteorologist—it could rain 
tomorrow.”114 The hair analyst seems to perceive the meteorologist 
as useless to the decision-maker unless she reports posterior 
probabilities. But, as we showed in our illustration above (Section 
III.A), we do recommend that the role of the forensic scientist is 
more like that of the meteorologist than that of the university 
President who must decide what action to take.115 
We do not think it is necessary for forensic scientists to 
perceive decision theory as disempowering. On the contrary, 
decision theory helps articulate reasons for experts to remain in 
their area of expertise and not be lured outside it by the pressures 
of the adversarial system. That is, in essence, a call to cut off the 
 
 113. Some readers may recognize this argument as similar to the arguments advanced 
by forensic statisticians based on Bayes’ Theorem as to why forensic experts ought not 
report about posterior probabilities. E.g., AITKEN & TARONI, supra note 82. The two 
arguments are indeed similar––and consistent. Decision theory simply offers yet another 
reason why statements like, “Mr. A is the source of this fingermark,” ought not be made by 
experts. 
 114. ABS GRP., ROOT AND CULTURAL CAUSE ANALYSIS OF REPORT AND TESTIMONY 
ERRORS BY FBI MHCA EXAMINERS 138 (2018), https://vault.fbi.gov/root-cause-analysis-of-
microscopic-hair-comparison-analysis/root-cause-analysis-of-microscopic-hair-comparison-
analysis-part-01-of-01/view [https://perma.cc/546Z-NDFV]. 
 115. Supra Section III.A. The analogy is not entirely apt. Meteorologists do give 
probabilities for possible states of nature when they report, for example, “there is a 70% 
probability of rain tomorrow.” To be entirely in line with the context of reporting in forensic 
science, the meteorologist would have to give probabilities for the meteorological data 
conditioned on, for example, “rain” or “not rain” (though these states of nature may be 
further refined)—thus, something along the lines of “I consider it ten times more probable 
to observe the meteorological data if it will rain than if it will not rain” (admittedly not a 
statement well suited to mass media communications).  
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rotten branches of a tree to help it concentrate efforts to the 
growing of the healthy parts. All that we are arguing is that 
forensic scientists should not offer statements that logically 
necessitate conceptual assessments that they cannot defensibly 
make—or, worse, they may not even be aware that they are 
making.116 In combination, one could just as easily perceive these 
reflections as empowering. 
We are also aware that our argument might make it hard for 
forensic scientists to perceive decision theory as “useful” to them. 
Indeed, it is true that decision theory is not a statistical tool that 
will directly help forensic scientists communicate the results of 
their analyses. Decision theory is “useful” to forensic scientists 
primarily in educating them about what not to do. Nonetheless, for 
forensic scientists puzzled or frustrated by arguments that they 
should not make categorical identification statements, we hope 
that decision theory can offer another way of understanding the 
reasoning behind such arguments. 
For legal actors, however, we think the usefulness of decision 
theory is clearer. It should allow judges and attorneys to more 
clearly see the appropriate roles for experts and fact-finders and 
how they can work together to produce a rational decision. 
A. Practitioner Uses of “Decision” 
In some forensic circles, it has become fashionable to use the 
term “decision” to describe the output of their analyses. For 
example, an increasing number of friction ridge examiners are now 
saying, “I made an identification decision.” Likewise, some 
researchers refer to forensic “decisions.”117 For these researchers, 
“decision” does not invoke decision theory; “decisions” are simply 
“responses” whose accuracy can be scored. This trend emerged 
independent of the ULTRs, although there is undoubtedly some 
influence in both directions. 
We have mixed feelings about this trend. On the one hand, 
the replacement of terms like “determination” or “conclusion” with 
“decision” can reasonably be interpreted as an effort toward 
 
 116. The underlying idea here is what in other contexts de Finetti has expressed with 
the sentence: “Nothing is lost what was a mere illusion.” Bruno de Finetti, Bayesianism: Its 
Unifying Role for Both the Foundations and Applications of Statistics, 42 INT’L STAT. REV. 
117, 121 (1974). 
 117. See, e.g., Amanda Luby, Decision-Making in Forensic Identification Tasks, in 
OPEN FORENSIC SCIENCE IN R, ch. 8 (Sam Tyner ed., 2019) (ebook); Bradford T. Ulery et al., 
Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 7733, 7733 (2011). 
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greater epistemological humility.118 “Identification decision” might 
convey to the fact-finder that the expert does not know the truth 
with certainty. The word “decision” seems to connote that some 
manner of uncertainty is involved. Thus, the use of the term 
“decision” may be seen as one of many arguments that forensic 
statisticians use to try to persuade forensic scientists not to report 
posterior probabilities. Likewise, when used by researchers, the 
use of the term “decision” may indicate an insistence on the 
uncertainty of forensic results. 
However, the word “decision” does not connote uncertainty so 
much as choice. Introducing the notion of choice into the reports of 
forensic experts ought to unsettle legal actors. Why, after all, is 
the expert “deciding” the meaning of the evidence, rather than 
simply reporting “the findings”? As discussed abve, the word 
“decision” sounds strange in this context. For all the reasons 
discussed, it seems inappropriate to include the expert’s choices 
and/or preferences in a report about the evidence. Likewise, 
researchers’ use of the term “decision” could be misinterpreted as 
conceding that it is appropriate for forensic scientists to make 
“decisions”—which, as we have discussed, would entail making 
assumptions about preferences. 
For other forensic scientists, the use of the term “decision” 
might be an effort to signal awareness of decision theory and some 
of the arguments outlined in this Article. For an expert witness in 
such a posture, the statement “I rendered an identification 
decision” would implicitly contain the following qualifications: 
— “I am fully aware that in making ‘an identification 
decision,’ I am making an assumption about the prior odds 
that the defendant is the source of the mark.” 
— “I am fully aware that in making ‘an identification 
decision,’ I am either applying my own preferences about 
the consequences of the various possible decisions or I am 
making an assumption about what someone else’s 
preferences would be.” 
If assumed to contain these qualifications, the statement—“I 
rendered an identification decision”—might, in principle, be 
considered logically acceptable. However, it might also be 
considered lacking in transparency: it would be better to make the 
qualifications explicit, rather than assume that legal audiences 
understand these very subtle qualifications to be implied merely 
 
 118. See generally Mnookin, supra note 3, at 139 (discussing epistemological humility 
and the use of more modest claims). 
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by use of the word “decision,” let alone agree that these 
qualifications are being made by the scientist. 
B. What Should Forensic Analysts Report? 
While we have been critical of many uses of the term 
“decision,” as a general matter we recognize that the growing use 
of the term may well mark an important step in the evolution of 
forensic reports from statements of certainty to statements of 
uncertainty, from “determination” to something more defensible. 
But what is that more defensible “something”? Is “decision” 
enough? 
Based on this analysis, and especially on Table 1, we tend to 
think that “findings” is the most appropriate of all the reporting 
terms floating around. “Findings” does the best job of conveying—
to the expert and customer alike—that the report concerns the 
evidence alone. Not the evidence combined with other evidence. 
And, not the evidence combined with preferences. “Findings” helps 
more clearly distinguish between the analysis of the evidence and 
the inference to be drawn from that analysis. And, “findings” is 
commonly used in other fields of science to describe the analysis of 
(empirical) evidence. 
In the long run, we hope to see the term “decision” have a long 
life in the law where it can be used to properly reconceptualize 
decision statements as decisions to behave as if a proposition is 
true, rather than claims that a proposition actually is true. 
Leaving identification decision authority to scientists would mean 
to let them continue to impose, implicitly, their unsubstantiated 
value assessments on a legal system that operates in deferential 
mode. By taking ownership of the term “decision,” the law could 
seize the opportunity to take control over a process that by its 
nature, i.e., a decision, lies in its area of competence. Genuinely 
understanding forensic identification as a decision, and controlling 
it, would also offer the opportunity to all parties to whom the 
evidence is of concern—most importantly defendants, who are the 
primary impacted subjects of identification conclusions—to have 
their say.  
And, finally, we hope for the term “decision” to have a useful, 
but brief life in forensic science, a stepping stone on the journey 
rather than the end of the journey, as forensic analysts 
increasingly turn their attention to where their expertise lies—in 
the analysis of evidence. 
 
